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1 Introduction 
When the Kyoto Protocol was first being hammered out (1995-97), negotiations were marked 
by distinct strategies of key actors.1 The European Union (EU) took the role as frontrunner – 
pushing for short-term, ambitious emissions cuts for Annex I countries – while the United 
States teamed up with like-minded countries in the Umbrella group and pushed for maximum 
use of mechanisms for flexible implementation of commitments.2, 3 The Umbrella group was 
an important actor in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, and consisted of Japan, the United 
States, Canada, Australia, Russia, Ukraine, New Zealand, Iceland and Norway.4 The other 
“economies in transition” supported the Umbrella group’s stance.5 The Group of 77 (G77) 
and China, meanwhile, supported the EU position that Annex I countries should take the first 
steps towards emissions reductions, but fiercely refused to commit to any binding emissions 
reductions themselves.6 Ten years later, negotiations continue but many of the key strategies 
have shifted, and the roles of the key actors have changed. The most dramatic change came 
when the United States in 2001 decided to withdraw from further cooperation in the Kyoto 
Protocol, on grounds that the agreement would be harmful to the US economy. 
In our study of the importance of strategy shifts among these key actors after the US 
withdrew from Kyoto, we start with a distinct introvert approach. More specifically, we focus 
on domestic climate policy development and discuss how domestic politics shape negotiation 
positions and strategies. We look into the four actor’s current positions, if and how their 
strategies have changed both with respect to the Kyoto Protocol and other key actors, and 
how their role in climate negotiations has developed.  
We argue that a more pronounced split between the EU on the one side and G77/China and 
the USA on the other has occurred; this view is reinforced by the recent establishment of the 
The Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (APP4CDC).7  
1 Bodansky 2001. 
2 The mechanisms for flexible implementation of the Kyoto Protocol comprise emissions trading (ET), 
joint implementation (JI), and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The three now called Kyoto 
mechanisms were introduced and agreed upon at different times in the negotiation process; JI was 
introduced in 1992 at the seventh meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC-7) 
negotiating the UNFCCC (the term was changed into Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) at the Berlin 
conference in March 1995 ), followed by ET and finally the CDM was accepted at COP3 in 1997 
which grew out of a Brazilian proposal for a Fund that should be financed by financial penalties on 
developed countries being in non-compliance. 
3 Grubb et al. 1999. 
4 The group was formed due to their common interest in emissions trading and joint implementation. 
However, (in particular) Norway, Iceland and New Zealand have disagreed with the others on some 
issues. 
5 The East European countries awaiting accession to the EU gradually approached the EU position as 
the date for accession approached. 
6 Aldy et al. 2003. 
7 The Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (APP4CDC) was established in 
July 2005 at the Association of South East Asian Nations regional summit. The members of the 
APP4CDC are China, Australia, Japan, India, the US and South Korea. The pact of six nations aims to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions through technology and voluntary partnerships (Black 2005). Not 
much information has been available on the partnership since its establishment, we therefore only 
mention it here. The countries will cooperate on the development, transfer and sale of clean 
technologies, to promote the efficient use of fuels. The agreement was welcomed by some as a 
supplement to the Kyoto Protocol (Brown 2005, Black 2005), despite any mention of mandatory 
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Moreover, Russia plays an even more pivotal role than it did earlier. Russia’s signature on the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997 was to a considerable extent caused by expectations of large revenues 
from quota sales to the United States. When the US pulled out of Kyoto the relationship with 
the EU gained in importance. Russia delayed its decision to ratify the Protocol for several 
years. Knowing that the Protocol’s entry into force hinged solely on own action, Russia 
demanded side-payments, particularly from the EU. But this process has also brought Russia 
and the EU closer together in climate policy and Russia now has deeper common interests 
with the EU in future negotiations than it has had before. 
Our argument is founded on the changes in the dynamics of the climate negotiations after 
the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol. What had previously appeared to be a growing 
recognition by domestic actors in the United States that climate change had to be addressed 
abruptly changed as a result of the Bush administration’s new policy. 8 At the international 
level, it motivated the remaining parties to overcome controversies and resolve undecided 
issues at COP6 bis in Bonn and COP7 in Marrakech – the same issues which led to the failure 
at COP6 in The Hague. While negotiations in Marrakech in 2001 were not visibly disturbed 
by the United States’ new role,9 this was not the case at COP8 in New Delhi.10 At COP8, the 
EU and most Annex I-parties were eager to build on the positive atmosphere from the UN 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 and initiate a discussion 
of post-2012 issues, which would include future commitments also for non-Annex I-parties. 
However, the United States had shifted both rhetoric and strategy, and now supported G77 in 
their rejection of discussing future (post-2012) commitments.11 As a result, the Umbrella 
group is now more divided, with the US and Australia teamed up supporting a different set of 
positions than the rest of the group.  
2 Analytical framework and methodology 
A total of 155 countries and the European Union representing 61.6 % of total CO2-emissions 
in industrialized countries12 in 1990 have ratified the treaty.13  Annex I minus the United 
States and Australia represent some 29 per cent of global GHG emissions (2000). We have 
selected four key actors (the United States, China, the EU, and Russia) for our multiple case 
study (Yin 1984). The four are the largest emitters of GHGs in the world, and the climate 
regime’s effectiveness is closely knit to them (see figures 1 and 2).  
 
reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions. Others see it as an attempt to divert attention away 
from the Kyoto Protocol by the USA and Australia who have not ratified the Protocol yet. The 
ministerial meeting scheduled for  November in Australia has been postponed until after the COP 11 
and COP/MOP 1 in Montreal in December 2005. See Brown 2005 and Black 2005.  
8 Jacob 2001. 
9 Even though the United States declared it would not take part in or interfere with the negotiations of 
the Kyoto Protocol at COP6bis, it shifted strategy towards COP7. The United States, as a party to the 
Convention, still took part in the negotiations of Convention-related issues and used the opportunity to 
exert influence indirectly by blocking consensus on Convention-related issues at COP7 to delay the 
Protocol-related negotiations. (Author’s observation.) 
10 Ott 2002. 
11 Jacob 2003. 
12 See UNFCCC Countries included in Annex I of the UNFCCC. 
13 The Protocol entered info force on 16 February 2005 as a consequence of ratification by parties 
representing 55 % of total CO2-emissions in industrialising countries. Russia ratified the protocol in 
October 2004.    
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Relativ share of global GHG emissions, 1990 and 2000
19.8 % 20.6 %
13.5 % 11.8 %
12.2 % 14.8 %
9.6 % 5.7 %
44.8 % 47.1 %
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
80 %
90 %
100 %
1990 2000
Rest of the world
Russia
China
European Union (15)
United States
 
 
Figure 1: Relative distribution of global GHG emissions in 2000, including CO2 from 
fossil fuels and cement, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6, but not CO2 from land use 
changes. Source: CAIT (WRI 2004). 
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Figure 2: GHG emissions of the world’s four largest emitters in total (left axis) and 
their GHG emissions per capita (right axis). Figures in CO2-equivalents for the year 
2000. Source: CAIT (WRI 2004), underlying sources: CDIAC, IEA, EPA, EDGAR. 
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In their capacity as pivotal actors, they have during different stages of the climate 
negotiations served as dynamos, leaders, or barriers to further commitments and 
environmental effectiveness of the regime.  
In our study of the importance of strategy shifts among these key actors after the US 
withdrew from Kyoto, we start with a distinct introvert approach. More specifically, we focus 
on domestic climate policy development and discuss how domestic politics shape negotiation 
positions and strategies. We look into the four actor’s current positions, if and how their 
strategies have changed both with respect to the Kyoto Protocol and other key actors, and 
how their role in climate negotiations has developed.  
We argue that a more pronounced split between the EU on the one side and G77/China and 
the USA on the other has occurred, and that Russia plays an even more pivotal role than it did 
earlier. Russia would have preferred US ratification and delayed its decision to ratify the 
Protocol for several years.  Knowing that the Protocol’s entry into force hinged solely on own 
action, Russia demanded side-payments. In the process of evaluating whether to ratify or not, 
Russia shifted its strategy from supporting the US positions until the United States decided to 
withdraw, into successfully bending the EU position after own preferences after the US 
pullout. As a consequence, Russia now has deeper common interests with the EU in future 
negotiations than it has had before. 
Our argument is founded on the changes in the dynamics of the climate negotiations after 
the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol. What had previously appeared to be a growing 
recognition by domestic actors in the United States that climate change had to be addressed 
abruptly changed as a result of the Bush administration’s new policy. 14 At the international 
level, it motivated the remaining parties to overcome controversies and resolve undecided 
issues at COP6 bis in Bonn and COP7 in Marrakech – the same issues which led to the failure 
at COP6 in The Hague. While negotiations in Marrakech in 2001 were not visibly disturbed 
by the United States’ new role,15 this was not the case at COP8 in New Delhi.16 At COP8, the 
EU and most Annex I-parties were eager to build on the positive atmosphere from the UN 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 and initiate a discussion 
of post-2012 issues, which would include future commitments also for non-Annex I-parties. 
However, the United States had shifted both rhetoric and strategy, and now supported G77 in 
their rejection of discussing future (post-2012) commitments.17 As a result, the Umbrella 
group is now more divided, with the US and Australia teamed up supporting a different set of 
positions than the rest of the group.  
In the next sections of the report, we elaborate on possible consequences for the climate 
regime resulting from the new alliances at COP8 and COP9, and the emerging split between 
the EU on the one side and G77/China and the United States on the other concerning the 
focus of future negotiations. We look first into domestic climate policy trends in the EU, the 
United States, China, and Russia and demonstrate how these policy trends have consequences 
for the international regime. For each actor we analyze the role and interests of key domestic 
actors, since negotiations are more than a game between unitary rational actors that pursue 
their national interests from a rational cost-benefit perspective; they are also a struggle 
14 Jacob 2001. 
15 Even though the United States declared it would not take part in or interfere with the negotiations of 
the Kyoto Protocol at COP6bis, it shifted strategy towards COP7. The United States, as a party to the 
Convention, still took part in the negotiations of Convention-related issues and used the opportunity to 
exert influence indirectly by blocking consensus on Convention-related issues at COP7 to delay the 
Protocol-related negotiations. (Author’s observation.) 
16 Ott 2002. 
17 Jacob 2003. 
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between negotiators involved in complex “two-level games” taking place simultaneously at 
the international and domestic levels.18 We also focus on how and why environmental NGOs 
and other non-state actors, such as the major oil corporations, influence policy development. 
In conclusion, we discuss the implications of the shifting strategies for the future dynamics of 
the climate negotiations and the climate regime. 
3 Key actors changing negotiation strategies 
As a result of the Kyoto Protocol, an increasing number of domestic and non-state actors are 
becoming more directly affected by joint international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Among the four key actors in this study, only the EU and Russia have taken on 
mandatory measures to comply with or implement the international climate regime. However, 
all of the four key actors are confronted with, and to a varying degree take into account, the 
need to address global climate change. The ways in which these actors have responded, 
however, vary considerably. The distribution of costs and benefits among key target groups as 
well as a number of other factors play a crucial role in explaining why this policy process 
turns out to be so different in these four key climate actors.19 It also gives us a better 
explanation for their positions and strategies in the international negotiations. 
3.1 The EU 
The EU has had strong leadership ambitions ever since the climate change problem emerged 
on the international agenda in the late 1980s. As a pusher for setting short-term commitments, 
and keeping the focus of the negotiations within the “targets and timetables” framework, the 
EU had reasonably good success. The EU leadership role in the negotiations escalated 
markedly after the United States rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. At the time, the EU was 
the only actor with sufficient political energy and strength to push for the adoption of the 
Protocol. Considering the US reservations to engage on the issue, it represented a rather rare 
“window of opportunity” for EU leadership on the international scene. Thus, it is not only 
concern for the environment but also more general political ambitions to stand forth as a 
united and forceful actor that motivates EU climate policy.20
The EU has historically been rather sceptical to the use of Kyoto mechanisms, favouring 
instead a climate strategy based on co-ordinated policies and measures (PAMs), and pushing 
for limitations on the use of the Kyoto mechanisms. However, there has been a remarkable 
change since the third Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto in 1997, culminating in the 
adoption of a directive for pan-European emissions trading set to commence in 2005,21 and a 
directive for the inclusion of project-based mechanisms as cornerstones in EU climate 
policy.22 On this account the EU could today be regarded as a frontrunner in the development 
and implementation of the Kyoto mechanisms.23 Responsible for 14% of total GHG 
emissions (EU-25), and with a growing economy, what the EU does to reduce emissions has 
an important imprint on potential climate change. Over the past two decades EU emissions 
are reduced, and accompanied by moderate population growth and substantial growth in 
18 Putnam 1988, Evans et al. 1993, Agrawala and Andresen 2001. 
19 Underdal 1998;  Sprintz and Weiss 2001. 
20 Hovi, Skodvin and Andresen 2003. 
21 European Commission 2003 
22 European Commission 2004 
23 Christiansen 2003; Christiansen and Wettestad 2003; Bang, Vevatne, Twena and Lee, 2004. 
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economic output (See figure 3). Reduction in CO2 emissions in the EU area is mainly a result 
of radical reforms of the energy sectors in UK and East Germany, mainly due to other factors 
than environmental policy.  
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Figure 3: Economic development, population growth and emissions of CO2 in the 
European Union (EU-15) for the period of 1971 to 2000. Source: CAIT (WRI 2004). 
 
Lessons learned from international negotiations as well as experiences from the 
development of EU climate policy have played key roles in the process of changing attitudes 
to climate policy options. Green NGOs played a key activist role, together with scientists 
providing expertise, in putting the challenge of global warming high on EU’s political agenda 
in the latter half of the 1980s. After negotiations were formalised in the early 1990s the 
governments took control over the process, and the influence of various green groups was 
reduced.24 NGOs have nonetheless been able to use their limited resources to stamp their 
imprint on the climate regime. Nearly all environmental NGOs in the climate change 
negotiations co-ordinate their positions through the Climate Action Network (CAN), a global 
network of almost 300 NGOs working to reduce GHG emissions to ecologically sustainable 
levels.25  
At the international level, negotiations and social interaction with other actors showed the 
EU that the Kyoto mechanisms provided a condition sin qua none for some countries to 
commit to legally binding emission reduction targets. Hence, the slow progress in the 
negotiation process, the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, and the need to 
prevent other Annex I countries from abandoning the Kyoto process gradually led the EU to 
change its position and become more prone to making concessions, and thereby take 
leadership when the hegemon resigned. Another mitigating factor is that developments during 
the 1990s brought evidence that achieving the EU’s Kyoto target could prove to be more 
difficult than previously expected. The use of emissions trading was increasingly seen as 
important to ensure cost-effective implementation of climate policies.26
                                                     
24 Andresen and Agrawala 2002. 
25 Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004. 
26 Christiansen and Wettestad 2003; Bang, Vevatne, Twena and Lee, 2004. 
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At the EU level, the protracted development of EU climate policy and increased learning 
about the Kyoto mechanisms gradually led to changes in preferences and policy. More 
specifically, the difficulties and barriers experienced in formulating a common and co-
ordinated climate policy, the centrepiece of which was the proposal for a common carbon tax, 
served to reinforce the search for other policy instruments better suited for the EU context. 
Constituencies in the EU were supportive of climate change policy action, and governments 
were trying to reap the green vote. Furthermore, the support from both environmental and 
business NGOs in favour of prompt action to address climate change helped create a 
consensus about early action. Once a broad consensus had been reached among the complex 
group of countries, institutions, and stakeholders (such as proactive business NGOs, 
environmental NGOs, and governments trying to harvest the green vote) that must be 
involved to implement EU policy, it was difficult to change course.27 The sheer complexity of 
the EU policymaking machinery impedes any abrupt changes in policy course. Thus when the 
US withdrew from the Kyoto process, too much was at stake and invested in the process for 
the EU to change path. The logical alternative was therefore to ensure that the Protocol with 
its mechanisms for flexible implementation worked.28
Besides learning from policy failure and institutional and political constraints, there has 
also been a process of learning more about the Kyoto mechanisms as such within the EU 
institutions and at the Member State level. Until Kyoto, the concept of mechanisms for 
flexible implementation was a territory little explored by the EU, and knowledge was 
essentially limited to academic circles and businesses following debates on emissions trading 
in the United States. After COP3, however, work was intensified within the Commission, 
during which social interaction with actors outside the EU and learning about other countries 
positions played a key role. A similar learning process is also evident within the European 
Parliament, which has had rather limited knowledge on the use of market-based mechanisms 
in general, and the Kyoto mechanisms in particular.29 Finally, it is important to recognise that 
opinions and positions on the use of Kyoto mechanisms have differed among Member States. 
In general, there appears to be a line of demarcation between Northern-European countries 
that tend to be more susceptible towards market-based instruments and Anglo-American 
liberal norms, and Member States like Germany and France that historically have been more 
inclined towards command-and-control approaches. Important in this respect is the start-up of 
domestic emissions trading schemes in Denmark and the UK, including also the set-up of 
procurement programs in the Netherlands for the purchase of credits from CDM and JI 
projects.  
In terms of future challenges, two issues clearly stand out: First, it will be critical for the 
EU to facilitate the development of an efficient and liquid market for emissions trading at the 
pan-European and international level. This might serve as an example for other countries that 
mechanisms for flexible implementation can work as climate policy measures without ruining 
the economy. Second, the EU needs to ensure the development of a multilateral climate 
regime for the period after 2012 that is based on participation and commitments from a larger 
number of countries, including also developing countries. To achieve this, it is crucial that the 
EU meet its Kyoto commitment target.30 Slow economic growth and difficulties in adjusting 
27 Hovi, Skodvin and Andresen 2003; Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow 2002. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Bang, Vevatne, Twena and Lee, 2004. 
30 In 2002, the greenhouse gas emissions from the 15 Member States of the European Union (EU-15) 
appeared to have decreased slightly. Emissions are estimated to have been 2.9% lower in 2002 than in 
1990. GHG emissions were 1.9 percent points above the Kyoto target path, and 5.1 percent point above 
the target of -8 percent for the Kyoto period (2008-12) (Source: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/gge_press.htm).  
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industries and work places to the new, globalizing economy in the 1990s proved that it may 
be more difficult than previously expected for the EU to meet its Kyoto target. If even the EU 
– the foremost advocate of the Kyoto Protocol – proves to be unable to comply, the signal 
effect could be devastating for the future of the Protocol and severely affect the dynamics of 
negotiations about future commitments. The EU has lately expressed preference for the multi-
stage approach, saying that “the ‘staged approach’ is a promising way to provide for 
differentiated participation by developing countries” (EC 2005:45).31  
3.2  The United States 
The United States was from the outset of climate negotiations far more sceptical to taking on 
binding commitments than the EU, a scepticism that culminated with its withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2001.32 The economic aspects, more specifically the cost-effectiveness of 
climate policy, have been vital for both the choice of policy instrument and the degree of 
involvement in the international climate regime for the United States.33 For example, 
throughout the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the United States put much weight on the 
importance of flexibility and broad participation for keeping costs down. The Clinton 
administration’s support for Kyoto was based strictly on the assumption that international 
agreement could be achieved on some of the most disputed and contentious issues in the 
Protocol: full emissions trading, joint implementation, and participation by developing 
countries.34
In the Kyoto protocol negotiations, the United States together with other members in the 
Umbrella group pushed for maximum flexibility. It opposed the EU on important positions, 
such as exempting the developing countries from binding commitments and imposing a 
ceiling for the use of Kyoto mechanisms to ensure that substantial action was taken 
domestically. The US also opposed the G77/China, insisting that developing countries must 
take on commitments in the first Kyoto period (2008-2012). 
Economists predicted that the costs for the United States would be relatively higher if 
emissions reductions were to be achieved in the short term, as with Kyoto. Furthermore, they 
calculated that the United States would bear the lion’s share of global costs in a Kyoto-like 
regime.35 With a rapidly growing population combined with high rates of economic growth, 
U.S. emissions have been increasing steadily over the past couple of decades (See figure 4). 
In Kyoto, the United States committed to cut emissions by 7% from 1990-levels, but during 
the 1990s its GHG emissions has increased by 18%. Reversing this development would entail 
large costs.36  
As a consequence of potentially high costs for the United States, the United States 
Congress, with the support of influential stakeholder groups, consistently opposed the “targets 
and timetables” approach that has been at the center of the Kyoto Protocol negotiation 
31 In a multi-stage approach countries are assigned to one out of three (or four) stages or categories 
dependent on development level. Countries in the first category have no commitments to limit their 
emissions, whereas countries in the second category should reduce their emissions relative to GDP. 
Countries in the third category should achieve an absolute reduction of their emissions (den Elzen et al. 
2003). 
32 The White House (2001). 
33 Stewart and Wiener 2003, Bodansky 2001, Baumert et al. 2002. 
34 The White House 1998. 
35 Cline 1992, Nordhaus and Boyer 1999, Shogren and Toman 2001, Stewart and Wiener 2003. 
36 Ibid.,and Grubb and Yamin (2001) and Svendsen (2003).  
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process.37 U.S. politicians have favored a longer term trajectory towards stabilizing 
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, arguing that it would in a more benign way secure 
continuous economic growth at the same time as it would mitigate climate changes.  
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Figure 4: Economic development, population growth and emissions of CO2 in the 
United States for the period of 1971 to 2000. Source: CAIT (WRI 2004). 
 
The policy instruments that have been applied in US climate policy have focused on tax 
incentives and energy efficiency as cost-effective solutions for achieving reductions for 
companies, and on the needs for intensified research to reduce scientific uncertainty.38 During 
the 1990s US firms in general were hostile to the idea of accepting policy regulations 
involving mitigation of GHG emissions. They adopted a confrontational strategy to avoid 
mandatory regulations, involving strong political pressure and outreach campaigns to 
influence the public opinion.39 The Global Climate Coalition and Exxon were major driving 
forces behind that strategy. Over the last few years, there has been a more visible split 
between US firms continuing to pursue a confrontational strategy, and others who have 
decided to accept voluntary action to reduce their emissions, including participating in 
emissions trading markets.40 For example, Environmental Defence has facilitated the 
Partnership for Climate Action, where US-based companies have announced a goal of 
reducing their aggregate emissions by 15% from 1990 levels by 2010 using market-based 
mechanisms.41 These firms show an interest in taking part in the growing markets applying 
Kyoto mechanisms and flexible policy solutions, such as emissions trading, joint 
implementation projects, and the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund.  
                                                     
37 Kraft 2000, Sprintz and Weiss 2001, Schreurs 2003.  
38 Bang et al. 2005, Rabe 2003. 
39 Bang 2004. 
40 Müller 2005. 
41 Christiansen 2003. Firms like Alcan, Shell, BP, Entergy, Ontario Power Generation, and Suncor 
Energy are members in PCA.  
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The NGO community has been divided over several issues, most notably the contributions 
of sinks – that is land use, land-use change and forestry – and the Kyoto mechanisms to the 
reduction of GHG emissions.42 This is largely due to different philosophies regarding the role 
of the market in global environmental governance. Environmental Defense has promoted 
market-based mechanisms and sinks as means to curb human-induced emissions. The World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) and a few expert NGOs, in particular Center for International 
Environmental Law (CIEL) and the Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development (FIELD), also had influence in the United Stated in the design of an effective 
and novel Kyoto compliance system. These organisations seem to have had some success 
with the insider strategy, framing issues in a creative and constructive way and providing 
expert advice to negotiators, particularly in the early phases of negotiations on new topics.43  
Considering the complexity of the climate issue, it is perhaps not surprising that a non-
confrontational insider strategy seems to have been more successful than traditional activism 
in influencing the international climate negotiations and domestic policy. In the US, however, 
this was before the election of George W. Bush to the US Presidency immediately following 
the suspension of COP6 at The Hague. As a result of the change of the US administration and 
the statement by President Bush that the US would not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol, 
environmental NGOs have almost given up on promoting the treaty in the US. Although 
European NGOs have been able to influence both international and domestic climate policy, 
US-based NGOs have focused on international talks, business and consumers to compensate 
for lack of access to their home government.44  
Domestically in the United States, a much stronger public demand and pressure on policy 
outcome has come from parts of the industry lobby. Representatives of powerful corporations 
that stand to be adversely affected by mitigation policies – in particular large energy 
corporations in the oil, gas, and coal industries – have continued to exercise substantial clout 
and effectively work against any kind of commitments.45 Multinational oil companies have 
different strategies for approaching climate change, but common grounds may be found in the 
link between international institutions and major multinational companies at either side of the 
Atlantic. The Kyoto Protocol represents a potent political force that has affected, and will 
most likely continue to affect, US multinationals with significant activities in Europe.46 While 
the Kyoto Protocol restricts access to participation in the Kyoto mechanisms to members of 
the Protocol, US multinationals operating in Europe and Japan will have to be in the same 
markets as companies that are operating on the inside of new “carbon markets.” How the 
positive and negative consequences add up for US multinationals remains to be seen. But 
many companies have had experience reducing emissions and have proved that such 
reductions can be achieved without negative economic consequences or increased loss of 
jobs. It is becoming clear that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is a problem that is 
not impossible to solve, and that the policy solutions are within reach.47 It is, however, also 
clear that the business sector cannot be the main driving force behind a proactive 
development. Fair and credible governmental incentives are required to continue a process of 
innovation and change that can be a potent response to climate change.48
42 Tjernshaugen 2005. 
43 Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Bang 2004. 
46 Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003. 
47 Browne 2004. 
48 Ibid.  
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In the absence of strong domestic political pressure within the United States in favor of a 
more proactive climate policy from the general public the Bush administration is unlikely to 
take steps towards a mandatory policy or indeed any policy to seriously limit greenhouse gas 
emissions. In US politics the Kyoto Protocol has become synonymous with a burdensome 
solution to the climate change problem, and has no chance of gaining support. However, the 
United States might become more open to reengaging in other forms of international climate 
policy cooperation. 
Concerns about the stringency and costs of emissions caps, including risks of unexpectedly 
high costs, will certainly constrain the range of targets that may be adopted by the United 
States for the foreseeable future. Technology focus – and more specifically interest in 
development of fossil-based no- or low-emissions technologies – is likely to be a resilient trait 
in the U.S. approach to climate policy even regardless of electoral outcomes.49 The Bush 
administration sees fossil fuels as pivotal to America’s future energy supply, even in a future 
where control of carbon emissions is deemed necessary. Commitment to the continued use of 
coal is not limited to the current administration. Since the oil shocks of the seventies, 
Americans have worried about their dependence on “foreign oil”. Environmental concerns 
apart, domestic coal constitutes a cheap and reliable alternative. Coal interests also have 
considerable political clout, as illustrated by the leading role Senator Robert Byrd of coal-rich 
West Virginia has played in opposing the Kyoto Protocol. The increased salience of energy 
security concerns in the post-September 11 political climate and the political realities 
stemming from the importance of coal in “swing states” that tend to decide presidential 
elections and Congressional majorities have led moderate environmentalists, such as the 
Natural Resources Defence Council and leading Democrats, to embrace R&D spending for 
development of carbon sequestration and coal-derived hydrogen fuels.50 These observations 
suggest that research and development activities regarding fossil-based technologies are likely 
to remain an area of intense interest for U.S. authorities – also with respect to possible 
international cooperation.  
As a result of these domestic policy traits, the United States changed its negotiating strategy 
since COP8 from insisting on developing country commitments to warning against it.51 The 
turnaround seems to be a result of outspoken opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, since it would 
affect the US economy negatively if emissions cuts are performed the way the Protocol 
determines. By supporting developing countries in not accepting commitments under such an 
international regime, and at the same time presenting new and alternative ways to reduce 
emissions that at the same time secure continued economic development, e.g. intensity targets 
or emissions relative to GDP, the US takes a stronger unilateral control over how it intends 
to handle the climate change issue. New coalitions are being built with both industrialized and 
developing countries, for instance with Australia, Italy, India, China, South Korea, and others, 
through bilateral agreements that focus on technology R&D, and carbon storage solutions 
rather than on short-term emissions reductions. In other words, the United States is engaging 
in new forms of multi- or bilateral cooperation, hence engaging in a new strategy for facing 
the challenges posed in the international climate change negotiations.  
3.3  China 
In the international negotiations, China in alliance with G77 has consistently refused to take 
on and even discuss emission commitments, arguing that it has implemented extensive 
abatement measures despite its position as a developing country. China’s measures in relation 
49 Bang et al. 2005. 
50 ENS 2003; Pickler 2003; Bang et al. 2005. 
51 Ott 2002.  
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to population control, energy efficiency and pricing are therefore arguments in the climate 
change discussion (See figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Economic development, population growth and emissions of CO2 in China 
for the period of 1971 to 2000. Source: CAIT (WRI 2004). 
 
Low per capita emissions has been an argument used by China in the negotiations - one 
eighth of the USA and about half of the world average52- and places the responsibility of first-
step emissions reductions on the Annex I countries. According to WRI’s CAIT-database 
however, China’s per capita emissions (2000 figures) are higher, about one sixth of the US’ 
(see figure 2). Although long awaited, China submitted its initial National Communications to 
the UNFCCC in November 2004.53 The National Communications indicate that China’s GHG 
emissions/CO2 equivalents in 1994 were 3650 million tonnes, of which CO2, CH4 and N2O 
contributed 73 percent, 20 percent and 7 percent respectively.54  1994 CO2 emissions were 
2666 million tonnes, which is half of the figure applied in the CAIT base. Furthermore, China 
claims that the country’s historical contribution to climate change is low.55  
China is often perceived as one of the key countries in the international climate regime for 
the following two reasons. First, China is one of the key players in the global climate change 
game due to its status as the world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs) after 
the USA. China contributed 13.5% of global CO2 emissions in 1996, whereas IEA figures say 
                                                     
52 Interview with MoFA offcial Beijing 2004.  
53 See PRC 2004. It was launched on 9th November. The summaries in Chinese and English are 
available on the China Climate Change Info Net www.ccchina.gov.cn. The full Chinese version (PRC 
2004) has been published and was circulated at COP 10. 
54 PRC 2004. 
55 Recent studies may call this claim into question. Historical emissions of GHGs from 1890 to 2000 
state that China is responsible for as much as one tenth of the global warming in 2000. Dai 2004; Den 
Elzen et al. 2004. It is nevertheless difficult to know the exact figure due to several chaotic periods in 
China both before and after 1949. 
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17.2 %.56 As illustrated by figure 1, China’s share of the global GHG emissions was 14.8% in 
2000, compared to the US share of 20.6%. During the 1990s, China’s GHG emissions have 
increased by almost 40 percent due to strong economic growth (see figure 5), and IEA 
anticipate a yearly increase of 2.8% (IEA 2004). This view is contrasted by research results 
indicating that China managed to reduce emissions in the period 1996 to 1999.57  It is 
generally acknowledged, also by Chinese officials and academics, that the country will soon 
surpass the United States unless drastic measures are carried out.58 Second, China’s status and 
influence in the G77 makes it a key country in the climate negotiations. As the world’s largest 
developing country with an influential voice in the United Nations, China is expected to play 
an important role in leading the developing countries in the future climate regime. On one 
hand, global climate change is not a critical priority for China, as the primary objective of the 
Chinese leaders is to develop the economy and improve the standard of living for China’s 
citizens, as well as to reduce local air pollution. On the other hand, Chinese scientists and 
bureaucrats are increasingly concerned about the impacts of climate change on China.59  
Since 1998, the National Development and Reform Commission has been responsible for 
co-ordinating work on domestic climate change in China; this illustrates the increased 
emphasis on climate change issues as the commission has the overall responsibility for the 
economic development issues in China. NDRC together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Science and Technology are engaged in formulating China’s negotiation 
positions. China was initially sceptical to the introduction of the Kyoto mechanisms under the 
UNFCCC, and saw JI and CDM as instruments for developed countries to run away from 
responsibility. The country’s position towards the Kyoto mechanisms has nevertheless shifted 
from scepticism to a more pragmatic focus on maximising benefits. In the past few years, the 
process of establishing a national system for identification, approval and implementation of 
CDM projects in China illustrates the changes in Chinese attitude towards the CDM after 
COP7.60 China at last announced the establishment of a Designated National Authority in 
June 2004 after some delay, and the State Council finally adopted and issued provisional rules 
for management of CDM projects.61 After more than one year, the revised measures for 
management of CDM projects were introduced and were effective 12th October 2005 (NDRC 
2005); the measures replace the interim measures of 2004.62  
56 Zhang 2000 and WRI 2004 respectively. 
57 China reduced emissions in a period 1996-1999 (Streets et al 2001), however, this has been debated 
by experts (Wu et al. 2005). Streets et al. state that China’s emissions were reduced in the period while 
China was experiencing economic growth (decoupling China’s emissions from growth). While China’s 
gross domestic product grew by one-quarter between 1996 and 1999, the reported use of coal dropped 
by over one-fifth See Sinton and Fridley (2000) for a discussion of the potential reasons for the drop in 
energy and coal consumption. 
58 It is interesting to note that the head of China’s Meteorological Adminstration, Qin Dahe, stated that 
China’s CO2 emissions may surpass the US by 2030-2035 (Li 2004). This date is somewhat later than 
other estimates: IEA expect China’s emissions to surpass the US by 2020 (IEA 2000). However, Qin 
Dahe’s statement illustrates that concern about China’s global CO2 emissions exists in China.  
59 Heavy rains in normally arid areas, sand storms in Beijing, floods in China’s major rivers, typhoons, 
and so on are directly attributable to climate change.  
60 Tangen and Heggelund 2003. 
61 NDRC 2004. 
62 The revised measures announced a tax of 2 percent on the projects in the priority areas, i.e. energy 
effciency improvement, development and utilization of new and renewable energy and methane 
recovery and utilization. Afforestation (and possibly reforestation projects) (zhishu zaolin) will be 
levied 2 percent. Heavier tax is levied on HFC and PFC projects (65 percent), and N2O projects (30 
percent). The fees collected from these projects will go into a fund managed by the Ministry of Finance 
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In addition, several CDM initiatives funded by bilateral and multilateral donors will 
contribute to capacity building in this area.63 China has developed important expertise in 
CMD policymaking within its bureaucracy, and has a few research institutes that focus 
mainly on technical aspects related to CDM projects. One challenge for China would be to 
include economists and market specialists in this work to gain understanding of the 
international market and thus increase the country’s ability to compete internationally for 
CDM projects.64  
With regard to future negotiations, China has approved the Kyoto Protocol (on 30 August 
2002)65, but has opposed any discussion as to how and when developing countries shall take 
on commitments. Climate policy is defined as a foreign policy issue, and is thereby 
influenced by spill-over from other foreign policy areas. Sino-US relations in the field of 
climate policy have been influenced by the argument voiced by US climate policy sceptics 
that the United States should not take on serious commitments as long as major developing 
countries like China and India do not have similar commitments. China has emphasised that 
as long as the United States does not take on commitments, it would be politically 
unacceptable for them to do so.  
On the domestic level, taking on caps presents a risk of limiting the basic energy use for the 
population.66 This is anticipated to have grave consequences for economic growth and 
thereby stability in the country. Also, China’s increasing urbanisation implies that energy use 
will also grow, since the rural population (768 million people)67 consumes limited energy at 
the moment. Currently, the consumption of rural energy is not counted in national energy 
statistics, thus the future emissions challenges will be in rural China.68
The comments above indicate that China is unlikely to take on commitments within the 
realms of the Kyoto Protocol in the near future. However, with China’s increasing emissions 
and its position as an emerging economic superpower, the pressure on China to take on 
commitments is intensifying. This is increasingly acknowledged by Chinese officials and is 
reported on in Chinese media.69 The development level of China will be important issue in 
the future negotiations for the 2nd commitment period to begin in 2005. Incomes are rising and 
the estimated level of income using purchasing power parity is 4 times higher than the official 
Chinese figure70 China however, states that it will keep its position as a developing country; 
the per capita GDP just passed USD 1000. 71  China generally has a great influence in the G77 
and there are no indications that China would wish to leave the G77 in the near future.72 It is 
nevertheless noteworthy that negotiators from developed countries state after COP10 that they 
 
and jointly decided by the NDRC and other relevant ministries, to be spent on climate change 
activities. See NDRC 2005. 
63 Initiatives are funded (together with bilateral donors) by the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, Canada, United Nations Development Programme, the EU and the World Bank Prototype 
Carbon Fund (PCF). See Wei, Heggelund, Tangen and Li (2004) for an overview. 
64 See the IBRD 2004 for more information regarding the potential for CDM projects in China.  
65 Xinhua 2002. 
66 Authers’ interviews with academics at CASS and offcials from NDRC, MoF in Beijing month 2003. 
67 CSB 2004. 
68 Authers’ interviews with CASS academics Beijing 2003 and 2004. 
69 China Climate Change Info Net 2004a. 
70 See, for example, IEA, 2004. 
71 China climate change info net 2004b and CSB 2004 respectively. 
72 Interview, MoFA official, Beijing 2004. 
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may detect a small change in the rhetoric of the Chinese delegation in the past year, albeit 
their basic principles have not changed. It has nevertheless become easier to communicate 
with China.73 It is premature to draw conclusions yet whether this will have any impact on the 
future role of China in the negotiations. China indicates that a different approach may be 
needed that takes into consideration the needs of the developing world. The current debate is 
distanced from other domestic policy issues, and does not relate to the development priorities 
of China. Thus, implementation driven by China’s domestic needs may constitute a 
conceptual way for China to approach the climate change issue. In other words, development 
priorities could be used to frame the climate change debate. This may also lead to China 
playing a more active and positive role in the climate change negotiations, which may result 
in greater involvement by other major developing countries.  
3.4  Russia 
Russia’s positive attitude to the Kyoto Protocol was initially firmly knit to the then assumed 
participation by the United States and the anticipation of economic gains from emissions 
trading between Annex I countries. In this phase, Russia supported the United States against 
the EU at difficult turning points in the international negotiations. After the United States 
withdrew from Kyoto, Russia performed a painful reorientation towards the EU; painful 
mainly because the outlook for economic gains was dramatically reduced. Russia sided with 
the EU when it became clear that the EU took over as the main driving force to implement an 
emissions trading system. 
The Russian attitude to the Kyoto process and the further development of the climate 
regime has been framed by four major factors: first, the unresolved issues in Russian climate 
policy; second, the internal institutional struggles; third, strong economic interests; and 
finally, external tacit bargaining. Economic growth and emissions of CO2 are closely linked in 
the Russian economy, with both trends peaking in 1989, and sharply falling as a result of the 
breakdown of the communist regime in 1990. From 1990 to 1998, Russian CO2-emissions 
decreased by 35.6 %.74 After 1998, however, both GDP and greenhouse gas emissions are on 
the rise again (see figure 6).  
As long as the climate problem has been on the international political agenda, there has 
been widespread climate scepticism in the Russian scientific establishment.75 Prominent 
scientists have argued against the existence of anthropogenic climate effects, and some hold 
the view that on the balance, climate change would be good for Russia. This was a major 
reason why Russia was considered a laggard in the early phase of the climate negotiations.76 
In addition, there was widespread concern that emission targets would harm Russian 
economic growth – arguments similar to those heard from developing countries. When Russia 
changed its positions and decided to accept binding targets by signing the Kyoto Protocol, it 
was no secret that the very promising economic benefits provided by the Kyoto mechanisms 
were a decisive factor.77  
After Kyoto an internal institutional battle became a major problem in Russian climate 
politics. In light of the enormous transfers promised by Kyoto, controlling positions in the 
development and future implementation of Russian climate policy became major stakes. This 
73 Interview with member of the Norwegian delegation, Ministry of Environment Oslo April 2005. 
74 WRI 2004. 
75 For a recent example of “climate scepticism”, see interview with the Head of Roshydromet, 
Alexander Bedritski, published in www.Strana.RU, 6 January 2003.  
76 Moe and Tangen 2001. 
77 Bedritskiy and Metalnikov 1998. 
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internal battle negatively affected further development of Russian climate policy: few AIJ 
projects were carried through, and reporting systems and inventories were delayed.78 Also, 
there has been no settlement on the key issue of who owns the surplus quotas – “hot air” – 
which was considered to yield enormous revenues under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Russia 1971 - 2000
-20 %
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
120 %
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
Years
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e 
G
ro
w
th
 fr
om
 1
97
1
Population
GDP
GDP per capita
Emissions (CO2: fossil fuel & cement)
Emissions (CO2: fossil fuel & cement)
per capita
Figure 6: Economic development, population growth and emissions of CO2 in Russia 
for the period of 1971 to 2000. Source: CAIT (WRI 2004). 
   
But even if there were conflicts between state agencies, climate policy was not really very 
visible on the crowded Russian political agenda. The top level of government was not 
involved in climate politics, and there was not much public debate. Over the last few years 
this has changed. Russian industries have finally started to show interest in the Kyoto 
mechanisms, notably the state-owned electricity system (UES), which established a carbon 
fund with the purpose of selling emission rights in exchange for investments in increased 
efficiency in the sector. Also the gas giant Gazprom has shown interest, in particular through 
co-operation with Ruhrgas. These industries, which are the biggest emitters, are against the 
sale of surplus quotas, since they have a vast amount of “fresh” emission reductions to offer 
for emissions trading or joint implementation projects. 
The exit of the United States from the Kyoto process had a dual effect on Russia. First, it 
meant that the outlook for big revenues was sharply reduced. This had the effect of turning 
many against ratification of the protocol. Second, it left Russia in a key role in determining 
whether the protocol would be implemented or not. These two developments form the 
background for the latest round in Russian climate politics starting in April 2002. Prime 
Minister Kasyanov set in motion a process that many outside Russia saw as a promise of 
ratification.79 After just a few months it became evident that there were obstacles, and 
Russian officials, while in principle endorsing Kyoto, claimed that additional assurances of 
quota purchases or investments were necessary to secure Russian ratification. This was also 
the indirect message from President Putin at the climate conference held in Moscow 
September-October 2003.80 Thus the ratification issue had definitely entered high politics, 
                                                     
78 Moe et al. 2001. 
79 Press release No. 580, 11 April, 2002, Press Center of the Government of the Russian Federation. 
80 http://president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/09/52992.shtml 
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connected to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, broader economic and energy 
co-operation with the EU, and geopolitical considerations – especially the relations with the 
United States.  
The EU officially rejected a link to WTO membership, but the two issues were both 
discussed at an EU-Russia summit 21 May 2004. The EU endorsed Russian membership in 
WTO, while Putin said that “we support the Kyoto process. We have some concerns linked to 
the obligations we must take upon ourselves… We will speed up the process towards Russian 
ratification”.81 Putin thus came out more strongly in support of ratification than before, 
without ruling out the possibility of further negotiations. Apparently the relationship to the 
EU as well as clarification of acceptable WTO terms played a major role when finally, on 30 
September 2004, the Russian government made the decision to propose to the Duma that 
Russia ratify the Kyoto Protocol. On 22 October 2004 the Duma ratified the Protocol.  
Earlier, as when Kasyanov apparently set the process “in motion” in 2002, the existence of 
draft legislation for implementing Kyoto and regulating key issues, such as the ownership of 
quotas, had been presented as a prerequisite for making a decision on ratification. But as long 
as the President gave no clear signal about his intentions, next to nothing happened. With the 
decision on 30 September, the government cut through this knot by endorsing ratification in 
principle – and at the same time ordering relevant ministries and other government bodies to 
work out a plan for implementation of the Protocol.82
Even though Russia now has ratified Kyoto, the further development of Russian climate 
policy as well as negotiating positions can not be expected to be a smooth ride. More 
domestic actors are likely to get involved as the distribution of short term benefits from 
implementation get clearer. This can mean new conflicts and stalemates. In the negotiations 
on post-2012 the widely held reservations due to expected costs for Russia may re-emerge 
and make the country reluctant to take on more ambitious targets. These reservations are 
likely to have strong support until it can be demonstrated that also in Russia economic growth 
does not necessarily entail corresponding growth in energy consumption. On the other hand, 
if the government is able to overcome internal feuds and develop a good way of implementing 
Kyoto, increasing numbers of domestic actors are likely to realize the potential of the Kyoto 
mechanisms.83 They may exert some influence on negotiating positions. Nevertheless, 
industrial involvement is still in an early stage, and it is uncertain what will be the dominant 
position of e.g. the oil industry, the strongest lobbying group in the country.  
Also after Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the underlying climate scepticism 
remains. Russia is still a long way from a national consensus on the climate problem and the 
correct remedies.  
4 Implications of shifting alliances 
The dynamics of the climate negotiations changed markedly after the U.S. repudiation of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The continued process of negotiation – and not least the making of a “new” 
regime embedded in an existing regime84 – will depend upon the “lessons learned” through 
the implementation experiences on the part of pivotal actors using different policy 
mechanisms. Extrapolation of current policy-trends in the four key countries examined here 
81 http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/05/21/2016_type63380_64688.shtml 
82 Press release from the Russian government 1 October, 2004, No. 1498 
http://www.government.ru/data/structdoc.html?he_id=102&do_id=1659, accessed 11 October, 2004. 
83 Müller 2004. 
84 Young 2002. 
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points to a rather gloomy future for international climate cooperation prior to 2012. Even 
though the Kyoto Protocol and its mechanisms have engaged new actors and initiated new 
policies, and will supposedly continue to do so in the coming years, resistance to real and 
binding targets under an international agreement will be strong. Hence, continuation of the 
current negotiation modus under the UNFCCC seems unlikely to be successful in engaging all 
major emitters in a meaningful way in the near future. 
Even though the Protocol has entered into force, considerable creativity is needed on the 
design of a future climate regime. This might include a new opportunity to engage the Annex 
I parties which have resisted ratification of the Protocol (like the United States), as well as 
major developing countries with large or rapidly increasing GHG emissions (like China). 
Negotiations for the second commitment period are according to Article 3.9 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, scheduled to commence no later than in 2005. However, at COP10 in 2004 the 
parties to the UNFCCC were not able to agree on whether or when these negotiations should 
start. They could not even agree on an official reporting format from the workshops to be 
organised the following year.  
We find that there are at least two possible consequences for the future of the climate 
regime resulting from the new strategies of the four key actors. First, it seems like the trend of 
EU leadership in the push for ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and 
pushing for negotiations about future commitments is being enhanced. At COP10, the EU was 
clearly taking the lead in initiating discussions about future commitments.85 Therefore, the 
performance of the EU and the Kyoto Protocol will have symbolic effects. Whether or not it 
is deemed a success will be important for the dynamics of future negotiations, both 
participants and non-participants of the Protocol. The EU has already decided to act as a 
pioneer in terms of implementing an emissions trading system from 2005 (see section 3.1). 
Seeking stability in its climate policy, the EU wants to maximize participation. Russia took 
advantage of its pivotal position, and increasingly demanded side-payments to ratify. At 
Marrakech, Russia achieved side-payments within the frames of the Kyoto Protocol in terms 
of being allowed to increase its use of sinks in its GHG emissions accountancy. In 2004, 
Russia demanded side-payments also outside the frames of the Protocol in terms of linkage 
between ratification and accession to WTO (see section 3.4). 
With the Protocol in force, we believe that the proof will be in the pudding. If emissions 
trading and other Kyoto mechanisms turn out to be a success, the EU and its Kyoto partners 
would be in a stronger position for steering the direction of future negotiations. If the EU fails 
to fulfill its commitments, or emissions trading turns out to be more difficult or more 
unsuccessful than expected, they will be in a weaker position for having a decisive say for the 
future direction of the climate negotiations. This would complicate future negotiations, and 
most likely mean postponement of more comprehensive and environmentally effective policy 
action to mitigate climate change.  
Second, the experiences made since COP8 tell us that the United States has changed its 
strategy from insisting on developing country commitments to warning against it, and has 
thereby entered into a direct opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and future commitments. The 
United States seems to be building new collaboration with both industrialized and developing 
countries, e.g. with Australia, India, China, through bilateral agreements. The United States 
has shown continued belief in technology development as the most cost-effective and 
environmentally efficient strategy to meet the climate change problem. In particular, carbon 
capture and geological storage technology is at the center of US attention, and constitutes a 
vital part of its current strategy. By entering into bilateral agreements with like-minded 
countries that share their belief in technology solutions, the United States can secure more 
85 IISD 2004 
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unilateral control over its approach to climate policy than was the case in the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations.  
One of China’s main arguments in the negotiations so far has been that it would be 
impossible for the country to take on commitments as long as the United States refuses to do 
so. The current changes of strategies may result in several scenarios for China: The most 
likely scenario is the “business as usual” – given the current situation where poverty 
alleviation and developing the economy are the main priorities, it is hard to believe that China 
suddenly will take on commitments to reduce its emissions. Nevertheless, there is a need to 
solve local pollution problems in the country, and bilateral and multilateral projects (such as 
energy related projects) may contribute to lower emissions, although not specifically because 
of climate change concerns.86 The second scenario is that stronger US-China relations on 
related issues such as economic development, trade and alternative approaches to adaptation 
and mitigation, could distance China from the international negotiations and the tight binding 
to G77. China’s role in the negotiations might hence be altered through bilateral co-operation 
with the United States. A third possibility is that with China’s increasing importance and 
participation in world affairs, the country will take on a more responsible and positive role in 
order to make the United States look like the laggard. In a game of “changing roles,” China 
may soften its position. However, if China were to take on commitments, it would have to 
gain substantial benefits like technology transfer and/or funding. Furthermore, even though 
China is no longer a poor developing country it would be politically difficult to leave the G77. 
Membership there still provides many valuable benefits such as a leadership role in the G77 
and influence through the G77 on the negotiations.  
We have identified several cases of shifting strategies and relations as a result of the altered 
engagement from the United States. In that respect we have pointed out how understanding 
domestic policies and pressure groups within the four key countries examined here is vital to 
understanding the positions and strategies they have adopted in the international negotiations. 
While the United States and pivotal developing countries have joined forces as a result of a 
rather paradoxical common interest in postponing discussions about future commitments at 
the latest COPs,87 the EU and Russia have found it important to support each other to make 
possible an international emissions trading system. 
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol may be seen as a political success, although it is 
well documented that its environmental effect is very limited.88 In terms of hard commitments 
the Kyoto Protocol can be described as a “mini-regime,” as the overwhelming majority of the 
nations of the world not have to reduce emissions to comply with the Protocol.89 Developing 
countries do not have to reduce emissions, and economies in transition (EIT) countries as well 
as some other key countries will meet their commitments with little or no effort. Hence, the 
Kyoto Protocol may well be a political achievement, but the real long-term challenges in 
transforming this “mini-regime” into a truly global regime still lie ahead. 
86 One example of this is the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP4CDC), 
the agreement between China, Australia, Japan, India, the US and South Korea to cooperate on the 
development, transfer and sale of clean technologies, to promote the efficient use of fuels. (Brown 
2005). 
87 The US rallied support of China and India to block European Union's (EU) efforts to start talks on 
how to reduce greenhouse gases after 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol on climate changes expires. 
China and India support US efforts to limit proposed talks next year on implementing current plans to 
reduce greenhouse gases. India Daily, Dec. 17, 2004, available at: 
http://www.indiadaily.com/breaking_news/17015.asp
88 See, e.g., Hagem and Holtsmark 2001. 
89 Andresen, Kolshus and Torvanger 2002. 
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Russia will have a key role in terms of how it chooses to act in the emissions trading 
market. There is a huge difference between a Russia that sells quotas to reinvest in its 
industries, and a Russia that sells “hot air.” The potential pathway of Russia will have 
consequences for the legitimacy of the Protocol and its planned emissions trading system. A 
Kyoto Protocol with considerable legitimacy might create international pressure that 
reverberates in domestic US politics, challenging the current perception in the United States 
that voluntary programs are the only policy that the constellation of domestic political actors 
can agree to. This could, in turn, lead to support of activities in Congress such as senators 
Lieberman and McCain’s Climate Stewardship Act of 2005.90 If not, a different climate 
regime may allow a long-term emissions reductions target, broad participation, and flexibility. 
In the United States, this would open for implementing policy instruments that credibly 
reduce economic uncertainty, which may increase willingness to adopt targets.  
At the moment, it seems most likely that the United States will further develop its 
inclination to adopt technology-oriented policy solutions. This is the main field where the 
Bush administration has taken an initiative for further developing multilateral cooperation on 
mitigation policies, through e.g. the intergovernmental Carbon Sequestration Leadership 
Forum (CSFL), the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE), the 
Methane-to-Markets Partnership, and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate.91 This issue area could potentially be the one area where multilateral engagement 
from the United States is possible until the country is ready to reengage in negotiations on 
emissions reduction commitments. It could prove to be a path for nurturing cooperation with 
selected countries and keeping the issue warm.92  
Another vital factor for success of a future climate regime is that the EU emissions trading 
system and the international emissions trading system under the Kyoto protocol turns out to 
be a success. The fact that the EU system has been successfully planned and that the EU 
members have managed to reach an agreement does not guarantee that the policy will result in 
environmental and economical efficiency. In the time-perspective pre-2012, however, there is 
no doubt that the EU emissions trading system will be important as a reality-test for carbon 
emissions trading – a concept that has never been tested on such a large scale before. 
5 Conclusions 
We have identified three important shifts of strategies and relations in the international 
climate negotiations as a result of the United States repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol. First, 
the EU has become a more pronounced leader in terms of moving the Kyoto Protocol process 
forward. In collaboration with some of the members of the Umbrella group the EU has rallied 
around the Protocol, and secured its ratification and entry into force. Second, Russia has 
changed its strategy from previously supporting the United States, to currently supporting the 
EU in securing the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Third, the United States has shifted 
its strategy towards a tacit understanding with the G77/China in not accepting future 
commitments to reduce GHG emissions, based on paradoxically different reasons. 
 These shifting strategies are founded in domestic climate policy developments, and 
we show how interest groups, distribution of costs, and policy preferences of domestic actors 
90 See a summary of the bill proposal at: http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=238307 
91 See a summary of President Bush’s major climate policy initiatives at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html. See also details about 
technology initiatives at: http://www.cslforum.org/;  http://www.iphe.net/; 
http://www.epa.gov/methanetomarkets/; http://www.methanetomarkets.org/  
92 Bang et al. 2005. 
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have consequences for what happens at the international level. We point to the EU’s 
persistence and leadership in climate policy. Once the wide-ranging EU policy system is set 
on a policy course, options for altering the course is limited by the complexity, time, and 
resources involved in reaching a new consensus. The United States, on the other hand, has 
been bound by strong interest groups that stand to loose from emissions reductions, and a 
political majority in Congress that is unwilling to accept commitments in terms of emissions 
reductions that can lead to relative economic loss. China has also shown unwillingness to take 
on commitments, although the reasoning differs from the US’; to secure economic 
development and greater fairness for developing countries. In Russia, the delay of ratification 
of the Protocol was found to be a result of elements like internal institutional struggles, strong 
economic interests, and external tacit bargaining. 
The implications of the shifting strategies for the future dynamics and development of the 
climate negotiations are found to be, first, that much hinges on the experiences we will gain 
from seeing international emissions trading of GHGs in practice for the first time under the 
auspices of the Kyoto Protocol. The success or failure of the Kyoto Protocol will be decisive 
for the bargaining power of the EU and other Kyoto members in future negotiations. Second, 
we find that since the United States has changed its strategy from insisting on developing 
country commitments to warning against it, the US has entered into a direct opposition to the 
Kyoto Protocol and future commitments. By entering into bilateral agreements that focus on 
R&D and technology solutions, the United States can secure more unilateral control over its 
approach to climate policy than was the case in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. These kinds 
of bilateral agreements might be the beginning of an alternative track to international climate 
cooperation – outside the auspices of the United Nations, or as a parallel track.  
After ten years of international negotiations about how to address the climate change 
problem, the countries of the world have gained substantial experience and understanding for 
the complexity and political difficulties involved. In that respect, policy solutions for how to 
address the problem are better known today than in the early 1990s, as a result of the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations. The international climate regime is, however, still marred by the 
constant and recurring dilemmas that cooperation on a global public good incorporate. In that 
context, it is very hard to identify a common political approach to address the problem as long 
as the uncertainties involved continue to be high and the issue of fair burden sharing is 
explicitly/apparently present. 
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